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Unconventional warfare (UW) originated in World War II as a defensive tactic, 
utilized to assist an occupied ally during a conventional war. Since then, Special Forces 
(SF) has changed the definition of UW to include offensive regime change as a strategic 
option. This type of UW was practiced extensively by the Central Intelligence Agency 
during the Cold War with poor results. The use of offensive UW by the United States is 
problematic for a variety of reasons, ranging from unreliable proxy forces to 
unpredictable results and negative international perception. The use of defensive UW 
under certain conditions remains justified and practical, but retains many of the same 
issues. After examining the history of the United States’ use of UW, this thesis concludes 
that Special Forces better serves the nation’s interests by promoting itself as the premier 
combined force of the United States military. 
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In April 2011, a group of nearly 150 U.S. Army soldiers shuffled into a small 
auditorium at Camp Mackall, a seldom heard of facility outside of Fayetteville, North 
Carolina. The soldiers ranged from officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with 
years of combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, to baby-faced enlisted men with less 
time in the Army than some of the veterans had in combat deployments. 
Regardless of experience, the soldiers were there for a common purpose. They 
were starting Robin Sage, the fifth and final stage of the Special Forces Qualification 
Course (SFQC). After over a year of training that involved learning a new language, 
small unit tactics, and a specialty skill, the soldiers had only one more stage to complete 
in order to earn the right to wear a green beret and become fully qualified members of the 
Army’s famed Special Forces (SF).1  
After the group was seated, a Master Sergeant instructor in his late 30s walked 
onto the stage. He welcomed the students and reminded them that they were not done 
with the course yet. This last stage would test the skills they had learned in the previous 
phases, and provide a final evaluation as to whether or not they deserved to graduate. The 
Master Sergeant then began an impassioned speech about why Robin Sage was so 
important. 
The Arab Spring was sweeping across North Africa and parts of the Middle East. 
Protests had recently erupted in Syria, with the Assad regime responding with deadly 
force. And, in Libya, a revolution was taking place. After decades of oppression by 
dictator Muammar Gaddafi, the people of Libya wanted freedom. The Master Sergeant 
looked towards the Special Forces crest painted on the wall of the auditorium, 
emblazoned with the unit’s motto: De Oppresso Liber (To Free the Oppressed). With an 
angry face, he looked back toward the students and asked, “Why aren’t Special Forces on 
the ground in Libya?” 
                                                 
1 Special Forces (SF) refers specifically to United States Army Special Forces, whose members are 
commonly referred to as Green Berets. Other special operations forces (SOF) include units such as the 
United States Army Rangers and United States Navy SEALs. 
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“Too many years in Iraq,” he told the students, “too many years in Afghanistan 
conducting kinetic operations.” SF could no longer execute its primary task and its core 
mission: unconventional warfare (UW). Green Berets were not chosen to conduct UW in 
Libya, because they had forgotten how. Robin Sage was vital because it would remind 
students that UW was their primary mission, and they had to be ready to execute it at any 
given time. Unfortunately, despite his well-intended bravado, the Master Sergeant had 
just mischaracterized and oversimplified a mission, UW, which has been repeatedly 
changed, expanded, and molded to fit real and perceived threats to the United States as 
they occurred over the last seven decades.  
At its core, “UW is specifically one topic: support to resistance movements and 
insurgencies.”2 When, where, and to whom that support should be provided remains an 
important question for the United States to consider before embarking on an 
unconventional warfare mission. This thesis will contend that when utilized in a 
preemptive or offensive manner, UW often results in unintended consequences that prove 
detrimental to the long-term strategic interests of the United States. It is therefore vital 
that U.S. policy makers understand the limited scenarios in which the use of UW is 
appropriate, while still recognizing the potential pitfalls that come with supporting a 
proxy force. 
It is important to note that the scope of this thesis is limited to the use of UW by 
the United States since 1945, and not by other countries elsewhere in the world. While 
the definition of UW has changed over the years, and continues to differ by audience, this 
thesis will use the current joint doctrinal definition of unconventional warfare: “Activities 
to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a 
government or occupying power by operating with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla 
force in a denied area.”3 This is the definition of unconventional warfare that I will apply 
to historical case studies, and the definition I will utilize when examining the viability of 
UW in today’s world. 
                                                 
2 Mark Grdovic, “Unconventional Warfare: The Current Dilemma,” slideshow presentation delivered 
to the author on 04 October 2016. 
3 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unconventional Warfare, Joint Publication 3-05.1 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 September 2015), vii. 
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II. ORIGINS OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND 
ITS PRACTITIONERS 
A. THE OSS AND THE JEDBURGHS—PLAYING DEFENSE 
The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was established on 13 June 1942 under 
William Donovan.4 While its primary mission was to conduct intelligence operations, the 
OSS conducted “unconventional warfare” as its secondary task.5 Today’s definition of 
UW includes the potential for disruption or overthrow of a sitting government, or 
expulsion of an occupying power, but the intent for OSS units was much different: 
The original concept for such special forces in World War II Europe was 
to support British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s idea of engaging 
the people of occupied Europe in a guerrilla war against the Germans. In 
this way, Churchill hoped to tie down enemy forces by compelling them to 
engage in counter-guerrilla operations far from the front lines. Guerrillas 
could also sabotage railways and ambush enemy columns, delaying 
reinforcements from reaching the front and improving the prospect for 
Allied victory and a reduction in Allied casualties.6 
This distinction is important. Far from being the main effort in pushing the 
Germans out of occupied France, or overthrowing the Vichy government, these original 
units were meant to sabotage and distract German forces to ease the advance of the main 
Allied force.  
To help accomplish these objectives, the OSS assembled 3-man teams, assigning 
them the codename “Jedburghs.”7 Each team was comprised of two officers and an 
enlisted radio operator. One of the officers had to be American or British, while the 
second officer’s nationality was required to correspond with that of the country the team 
                                                 
4 “What Was OSS,” Central Intelligence Agency, last modified 28 June 2008, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/intelligence-history/oss/art03.htm. 
5 Troy J. Sacquety, “Office of Strategic Services: A Primer on the Special Operations Branches and 
Detachments of the Office of Strategic Services,” Veritas, PB 31-05-2 3, no. 4 (December 2007).  
6 Will Irwin, The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944 (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2005), xix. 
7 This portion of the OSS focused almost exclusively on occupied France and other parts of Europe, 
but the OSS also deployed other units to the Pacific theater, such as Det 101.  
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would be operating in.8 Many of the teams were dropped into occupied France, where 
they linked up with various French resistance groups, organized arms drops, and 
conducted sabotage operations against the Germans as the main Allied force advanced 
from the Normandy coast.  
Today, the OSS continues to be revered by the Special Forces community. 
“Considered a legacy unit of U.S. Army Special Operations Forces, the Office of 
Strategic Services has assumed almost mythical stature since World War II.”9 At the 
center of this “mythical stature” is the familiar UW mission: “It was this element of the 
OSS that provided the most exciting stories and which was cloaked by an aura of secrecy 
and mystery. These UW missions have become the subject of numerous books and 
several films.”10  
However, today’s version of UW differs significantly from what was expected 
during World War II. The Jedburghs of 1944 were meant to do no more than assist 
French resistance forces in guerrilla-type operations against the Germans. This tactical-
level tasking was their definition of unconventional warfare. Today, the doctrinal 
definition (and expectation) of unconventional warfare has expanded to the point that 
proponents of the strategy admit that the UW mission is now a “US national strategic 
mission,” that requires interagency and Department of Defense (DOD) cooperation.11 
Additionally, UW has now been declared, “an offensive option for policymakers and 
strategists.”12 The Jedburghs of 1944 were used in defense of an occupied ally in the 
midst of a world war. So, how did the concept and definition of UW expand to include an 
offensive option meant to disrupt sitting governments around the world? 
                                                 
8 Irwin, Jedburghs: The Secret History, 64. 
9 Sacquety, “Office of Strategic Services.” 
10 Ibid. 
11 David S. Maxwell, “Unconventional Warfare Does Not Belong to Special Forces,” War on the 




B. THE CREATION OF THE CIA AND COVERT ACTION   
While World War II continued to rage across Europe in 1944, Bill Donovan had 
already started advocating for a post-war version of the OSS to continue its intelligence 
operations.13 Following the end of World War II and “a long series of disputes between 
the State, War, and Navy Departments and the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 
over who a new ‘national intelligence structure’ would answer to,”14 President Truman 
signed the National Security Act of 1947, officially creating the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA). At the time of its creation, one third of the CIA’s personnel had OSS 
experience from World War II.15 This experience would be put to use during the CIA’s 
earliest operations. 
The CIA’s creation led to further debate, this time over the proposed use of covert 
action, and who would be responsible for it. At the time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought 
that propaganda and covert activities were more suited to the State Department than to 
the Department of Defense.16 However, Secretary of State George Marshall made it quite 
clear that he and the State Department wanted nothing to do with covert action. “The 
Secretary of State was unwilling to accept responsibility for such activities . . . on 
grounds that their exposure would discredit the State Department itself.”17 As a result, 
“the CIA took operational responsibility for the United States’ covert action programme 
as a consequence of Marshall’s fear of exposure.”18  
Why, we might wonder, were so many senior decision makers—including the 
architect of perhaps the greatest “day after” plan—so hesitant to take responsibility for 
covert action?  
A covert operation, as defined by the Department of Defense, is “an operation that 
is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the 
                                                 
13 James Callanan, Covert Action in the Cold War: U.S. Policy, Intelligence, and CIA Operations 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 16. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 20 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 23 
18 Ibid. 
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sponsor.”19 Historian John Nutter adds to this definition by saying that “a covert action is 
an operation intended to change the political policies, actors, or institutions of another 
country, performed so that the covert actor’s role is not apparent.”20 In 1976, the Church 
Committee defined covert action as “any clandestine operation or activity designed to 
influence foreign governments, organizations, persons or events in support of United 
States foreign policy.”21 
While these definitions vary, commonalities can be found in both military and 
academic literature when it comes to covert action. The first is concealment of the 
sponsor. The second relates to the purpose, which is to exert American influence over 
another government, organization, or individual. It is this second shared feature that ties 
covert action to today’s definition of unconventional warfare.  
John Nutter goes on to define the types of covert operations as including 
“paramilitary actions, terrorism, assassinations, manipulating or ‘fixing’ election, arms 
supplying, and propaganda campaigns.”22 James Callanan divides covert action into four 
categories: “(1) propaganda and psychological warfare; (2) political operations such as 
supporting democratic parties and labour unions in friendly countries; (3) economic 
operations; and (4) paramilitary action which includes counterinsurgency and 
assassination programs.”23 Every one of these categories of covert action could be 
associated with coercing, disrupting, or overthrowing other governments.  
Given that covert action is comprised of these activities, what then distinguishes 
unconventional warfare? 
                                                 
19 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 November 2010), as amended 
through 15 February 2016, 55. 
20 John Jacob Nutter, The CIA’s Black Ops (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2000), 19. 
21 U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities, United States Senate: Together with Additional, Supplemental, and Separate Views, 
vol. 1, Foreign and Military Intelligence – Book 1 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 26 
April 1976), 141. 
22 Nutter, CIA’s Black Ops, 19. 
23 Callanan, Covert Action in the Cold War, 1. 
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C. SPECIAL FORCES AND THE ORIGINAL DEFINITION OF UW 
While the CIA began to experiment with offensive covert action in the years 
following World War II, another Jedburgh veteran was establishing a new unit within the 
United States Army. Colonel Aaron Bank officially established the 10th Special Forces 
Group (Airborne) in the summer of 1952. Originally garrisoned at Ft. Bragg, the Group 
soon moved to Bad Tölz, Germany in order to be better positioned to accomplish its 
mission.  
Like their CIA counterparts, many of the original members of Special Forces had 
extensive experience with the OSS and Jedburgh programs during World War II, and 
“brought unconventional warfare tactics and techniques to Special Forces in the early 
1950s.”24 However, the dispersing of OSS veterans into two separate organizations 
created a debate as to who would assume responsibility for the activities that had been 
conducted by the OSS during World War II.25 The eventual conclusion was that the CIA 
would handle peacetime activities, while Special Forces (SF) would be in charge during 
wartime.26 This was a less-than-ideal solution that assumed future conflicts would 
involve declared wars, most likely involving the Soviet Union. The OSS veterans who 
had joined Special Forces objected to this split, but nonetheless began to produce doctrine 
that would help define their mission and purpose.27 
In 1955, the term “unconventional warfare” first appeared in an Army Field 
Manual, which defined it as “the inter-related fields of guerrilla warfare, escape and 
evasion, and subversion against hostile states.”28 This definition took the techniques used 
by the OSS and grouped them into a mission. The chapters in the early Special Forces 
field manuals were devoted to subjects like guerrilla communications, logistics, and the 
selection and set-up of resupply drop zones. Special Forces “A-Teams” were seen as 
                                                 
24 Sacquety, “Office of Strategic Services.” 
25 Mark Grdovic. “Fundamentals of Unconventional Warfare,” slideshow presentation delivered to the 
author on 05 October 2016. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Special Forces Group (Airborne) (U), Field Manual 31–20 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 1955), 132. 
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tactical level trainers, tasked to train resistance forces and conduct sabotage operations 
with friendly guerrillas. 
Unlike their brethren in the CIA, the original members of Special Forces did not 
immediately try to adapt unconventional warfare into an offensive mission. Instead, 10th 
Special Forces Group (Airborne), “was expected to exploit the resistance potential in 
eastern Europe if the Soviets attacked the West.”29 The Lodge-Philbin Act of 1950 
allowed Special Forces to recruit foreign nationals from Eastern Europe into their ranks, 
creating a “stay behind” unit full of locals who could instantly blend into the local 
population in the event of a Soviet invasion.30 The original Green Berets fell into the 
“break glass in case of emergency” category. Their posture in Germany was primarily 
defensive, and their original mission was only to be executed in the event of a Soviet 
offensive. 
Over 60 years later, the concept of unconventional warfare is now the subject of a 
joint publication that fully embraces UW as a strategy, not a tactic. This publication 
breaks unconventional warfare into two types. The first is defined as a supporting line of 
operation within a broader military campaign.31 This is essentially a replica of the 
Jedburgh experience in World War II, and has merit in the event of a U.S. ally being 
invaded or occupied. However, “the second type of UW is employed as the strategic main 
effort, either as an initiative or as a response to aggression.”32 It is this second type that 
definitively links today’s idea of unconventional warfare to what the CIA has historically 
referred to as covert action. This is also the type of UW that has resulted in long-term 
strategic failure for the United States over the past 70 years. 
                                                 
29 Joel Nadel with J. R. Wright. Special Men and Special Missions: Inside American Special 
Operations Forces 1945 to the Present (London: Greenhill Books, 1994), 33. Emphasis added. 
30 H. A. Gill III, A Soldier Under Three Flags: Exploits of Special Forces Captain Larry A. Thorne 
(California: Pathfinder Publishing, 1998), 123. 
31 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05.1, I-5. 
32 Ibid. 
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III. THE CIA TAKES UW ON THE OFFENSIVE 
AGAINST COMMUNISM 
As the newly formed 10th Special Forces Group was building its capacity to assist 
partisans behind Soviet lines, the CIA embarked on a period of experimentation with 
offensive unconventional warfare. Some of its missions achieved immediate tactical 
success for the CIA, leading to the false assumption that UW could be used throughout 
the Cold War at minimal cost to the United States. 
A. SETTING THE STAGE: ITALY 1948 
As the U.S. began implementing the Marshall Plan to help bring some level of 
stability back to post-World War II Europe, Italy emerged as a battleground in what 
would become a half century-long Cold War against communism. With the 1948 Italian 
elections on the horizon, President Truman and the United States recognized that the 
Italian Communist Party (PCI) had emerged as the clear favorite.33 Viewing the 
emergence of an Italian communist government as a threat to the stability of the 
surrounding region and the rebuilding of Europe as a whole, Truman authorized actions 
to prevent the communists from winning, which led to the CIA’s initial foray into 
unconventional warfare.34 
Still in its infancy, the exact role of the CIA was still being heavily debated; it had 
no specific authorization to conduct covert operations. The Truman Administration’s 
primary efforts were concentrated on overt political actions, sponsoring a “massive 
propaganda effort,”35 while pledging military support and funds on the condition that the 
communists were not elected.36 
The smaller, covert portion of this strategy began with the CIA’s creation of the 
Special Procedures Group (SPG) in late 1947, a group specifically tasked to intervene in 
                                                 
33 Nutter, CIA’s Black Ops, 51. 
34 Callanan, Covert Action in the Cold War, 24; Ironically, Nutter notes that the PCI “had been the 
most effective antifascist resistance organization during World War II.” 
35 Nutter, CIA’s Black Ops, 52. 
36 Ibid., 51–52. 
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the Italian elections.37 Utilizing a $10 million budget, the SPG began laundering money 
and delivering it to anti-communist political organizations,38 while also launching a 
disinformation campaign involving promises of a Soviet-controlled government if the 
PCI was to win.39 
The result of these efforts was the defeat of the PCI in the 1948 elections. The 
Italian operation “established covert action as a viable menu choice for American 
presidents,”40 and “helped to convince America’s political elite of the value of 
psychological warfare as a tool of containment.”41 While the bulk of this operation was 
conducted via overt support to Italian political parties friendly to America, the CIA had 
convinced itself and decision makers that its limited use of covert tactics could be 
expanded into a standalone campaign. 
B. FIRST SIGNS OF TROUBLE: ALBANIA AND BGFIEND 
As the 1950s began, the CIA had yet another opportunity to recognize some of the 
drawbacks of unconventional warfare. Albania had fallen under Soviet influence after 
World War II, and was being run by a communist government under Enver Hoxha.42 In 
conjunction with Britain’s MI6, the CIA launched BGFIEND, an operation designed to 
overthrow Hoxha and eliminate communist influence in Albania. The operation was a 
complete failure. 
As the CIA and MI6 launched BGFIEND, double-agent Kim Philby was leaking 
details of the operation to the Soviets.43 Meanwhile, the planners were unable to identify 
a “viable political alternative to Hoxha.”44 In a statement that should make anyone 
involved in 21st century policy decisions about Afghanistan shudder, James Callanan 
notes that, “Where the judgement of BGFIEND’s planners was seriously flawed was in 
                                                 
37 Callanan, Covert Action in the Cold War, 37. 
38 Ibid., 37–38. 
39 Nutter, CIA’s Black Ops, 52. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Callanan, Covert Action in the Cold War, 43. 
42 Ibid., 70. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 81. 
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their failure to recognize the fact that little in the way of a sense of national identity 
existed in Albania. The country was essentially a collection of tribes.”45 
Yet, none of this mattered to the CIA. BGFIEND’s planners regarded the 
operation as a case study to be learned from rather than an indicator that an offensive UW 
mission has inherent flaws. Determined to learn from its mistakes in BGFIEND, the CIA 
decided to try again. 
C. TPAJAX: FALSE HOPE FOR UW 
During Dwight Eisenhower’s 1952 presidential campaign, future Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles criticized the Truman administration for failing to stop 
communist influence in Iran.46 Dulles’ brother, Allen, was also slated to become the 
director of the CIA under Eisenhower. Together, this created a perfect storm of top U.S. 
officials who were “more eager than their predecessors to use the CIA’s covert political 
action capabilities.”47 This eagerness would lead to unconventional warfare completing 
its conversion to an offensive mission during the Eisenhower administration.  
Sharing the Dulles brothers’ concern about the spread of communism, 
Eisenhower utilized the CIA to conduct preemptive unconventional warfare throughout 
his presidency. The goal of Eisenhower’s unconventional warfare was simple:  
The removal of Third World leaders whose nonaligned stances left their 
countries vulnerable to communist takeover, and the subsequent 
replacement of those leaders with strongly pro-Western successors who 
could be relied upon to pursue policies that were compatible with 
American interests, if not always with the interests of the populations that 
they represented.48 
According to the CIA’s own after action report, at the end of 1952 it had been 
determined that the democratically-elected government under Iranian Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mosaddeq was “in real danger of falling behind the Iron Curtain; if that 
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happened it would mean a victory for the Soviets in the Cold War and a major setback for 
the West in the Middle East.”49 Beyond the Eisenhower Administration’s anxiety about 
communist influence in Iran, oil also played a key role: 
Mosaddeq moved quickly to end British exploitation of Iran, in which a 
British company, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), earned ten 
times as much profit as it paid in royalties to Iran. Mosaddeq nationalized 
the country’s oil facilities, reduced the young shah to a figurehead, and 
legalized the small Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh. Although 
Mosaddeq offered compensation to the AIOC . . . Britain organized a 
boycott of Iranian oil, but this failed to have immediate political effect, so 
it then turned to the United States, and the CIA for help.50 
The combined venture between the CIA and Britain’s MI6 would be called 
Operation TPAJAX, with the stated goal of causing “the fall of the Mossadeq 
government; to reestablish the prestige and power of the Shah; and to replace the 
Mossadeq government with one which would govern Iran according to constructive 
policies.”51 
The specifics of TPAJAX are not as important as the overall outcome and the 
long-term effects of the operation. The coup itself was successful—Mossadeq was ousted 
and replaced by the Shah with the support of General Fazlullah Zahedi, a former Nazi 
sympathizer whose less appealing character traits were ignored by Foster Dulles in favor 
of General Zahedi’s eagerness to appease his American sponsors.52 In moves that should 
have surprised no one, Zahedi began to consolidate power around the Shah after the coup, 
eliminating political competitors and contributing to the environment that would 
eventually lead to the Iranian Revolution.53 
The irony in the fact that the United States had successfully ousted a 
democratically elected government, only to replace it with an authoritarian monarchy, 
was apparently lost on the Eisenhower Administration as well as on the participants in the 
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coup, all of whom showed an astounding degree of arrogance following the operation. 
One of the primary architects of the coup, CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt (Theodore’s 
grandson), begins his published account by declaring, “This book ends in triumph . . . the 
Shah said to me truthfully, ‘I owe my throne to God, my people my army—and to you!’ 
By ‘you’ he meant me and the two countries—Great Britain and the United States—I was 
representing. We were all heroes.”54 
Worth noting is that by the time Roosevelt wrote his account of TPAJAX in 1979, 
Iran was in the midst of another revolution. Originally considered an asset by the CIA 
and the U.S. government, the Shah had since become a liability. Once in power, the Shah 
proved less interested in doing what the United States wanted him to, and more interested 
in consolidating that power through the elimination of competitors and the oppression of 
his people. The results of these actions and their long-term effects are succinctly captured 
by Mark Gasiorowski in his account of TPAJAX: 
Many Iranians blamed this on the United States, arguing that the 1953 
coup and the extensive U.S. support for the shah in subsequent years were 
largely responsible for the shah’s arbitrary rule. As a result, the revolution 
had a deeply anti-American character, and U.S.-Iran relations have 
remained tense ever since. Indeed, the coup has had such a powerful 
impact on Iran’s political consciousness that many Iranians today still 
believe the United States is working covertly to undermine or overthrow 
their government.55 
As he watched the 1978–1979 Iranian Revolution nullify the success achieved by 
TPAJAX, Roosevelt was quick to bookend his account of the operation with both excuses 
and blame. According to Roosevelt, the fact that the Shah was viewed by his people as an 
American puppet contributed nothing to the Iranian Revolution. Neither did his 
authoritarian crackdowns and elimination of political rivals. Instead, it was “the growth 
of political ambitions” that brought down a man who Roosevelt regarded as the second 
most successful leader in Iranian history.56 
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In his debriefing by the Eisenhower Administration, Roosevelt wasted no time in 
pinning future UW debacles on John Foster Dulles. Describing him as a smiling, purring 
cat, Roosevelt claimed that Dulles simply did not want to listen to warnings about the 
difficulty of future UW endeavors, and was instead eager to embark on them.57 Roosevelt 
tried to warn Dulles one last time, telling him, “If our analysis had been wrong, we’d 
have fallen flat on our, er, faces. But it was right. If we, the CIA, are ever going to try 
something like this again, we must be absolutely sure that the people and army want what 
we want. If not, you had better give the job to the Marines!”58  
In this briefing, Roosevelt claimed that he and his peers had gotten their analysis 
right, and that the CIA had successfully assessed the situation and people in Iran.59 
Despite the fact that TPAJAX involved rigged elections, staged protests, and a massive 
misinformation campaign, Roosevelt confidently told Eisenhower that, “With some help 
from us,” the Iranian people freely chose an authoritarian monarch over their 
democratically elected prime minister.60  
Yes, Operation TPAJAX secured Iran as an ally for the United States for roughly 
25 years. However, the adversarial relationship between the two countries is now 
approaching 40 years in length. Since the Iranian revolution, Iran has become a major 
power broker in the Middle East that has consistently antagonized the United States and, 
in some cases, killed American service members. The failed Iranian hostage rescue, 
Operation EAGLE CLAW, resulted in the death of eight Americans and the public 
humiliation of the country. The Iran-Iraq War resulted in dozens more American 
casualties, and another international embarrassment for the United States when a U.S. 
Navy destroyer shot down an Iranian commercial airliner, killing all onboard.  
After being declared a member of the “Axis of Evil” by President George W. 
Bush in 2002, Iran became all the more eager to assist insurgents fighting against U.S. 
forces in Iraq following the 2003 invasion. Leading this unconventional warfare 
                                                 





campaign was Major General Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the Iranian Quds 
Force. Exact numbers are difficult to determine, but Iranian training and equipment from 
the Quds Force is estimated to have caused hundreds of American deaths during the Iraq 
War.61 When the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) reemerged in 2014, Suleimani 
was quickly spotted on the ground in Iraq, advising Shi’a militias while further 
complicating the relationship between the U.S. and the heavily Iranian-influenced Iraqi 
government.62 
Of course, at the time of the 1953 coup, none of these prospects was envisioned 
by the Eisenhower Administration. Asking someone to predict future world events is a 
losing proposition. However, appreciating that unpredictability is crucial when weighing 
whether or not unconventional warfare is a viable strategy. When an overthrow is 
successful, history has shown that there is little to no control over the installed 
replacement. Whether that replacement is the result of unconventional warfare, as in the 
case of the Shah, or is instead the product of a full-scale conventional invasion as in the 
case of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, there is no guarantee that the new 
leader will continue to do what the U.S. government wants him to do once he is in power.  
D. NO TURNING BACK: PBSUCCESS 
While Roosevelt’s descriptions of the over-eager, cat-like John Foster Dulles are 
amusing, decisions made following TPAJAX reveal that his assessment of the Secretary 
of State was correct. The Eisenhower Administration considered TPAJAX a major 
success, leading to Eisenhower’s subsequent approval of Operation PBSUCCESS, a plan 
to overthrow the democratically elected government of Guatemala.63 As with TPAJAX, 
the exact specifics of the overthrow are less important to the study of unconventional 
warfare than the results of the operation. 
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President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán was elected president of Guatemala in 1950, 
following the six-year term of Juan José Arévalo.64 Under reforms instituted by Arévalo 
and Arbenz, increased rights were granted to Guatemalan laborers, which directly 
threatened profits of the United Fruit Company (UFCO). Responding to this threat, 
UFCO not only dispatched some of its executives to meet with high-ranking officials in 
the State Department and the CIA, but also unleashed a propaganda campaign designed 
to promote the narrative that Arbenz’s government was moving toward communism.65  
In the waning days of the Truman Administration, the CIA had executed 
Operation PBFORTUNE in an effort to provide arms to dissidents and assist them in 
overthrowing Arbenz.66 However, word of America’s involvement in arming the rebels 
quickly spread, causing Secretary of State Dean Acheson to terminate the operation.67 
PBSUCCESS emerged once the Eisenhower Administration had noted the “success” of 
TPAJAX. It was thought that the same template used in Iran could be applied to 
Guatemala. 
Roosevelt fretted that, “If we, the CIA, are ever going to try something like this 
[TPAJAX] again, we must be absolutely sure that people and army [sic] want what we 
want.”68 Ignoring this advice, the CIA executed PBSUCCESS with “no existing 
intelligence networks in place in Guatemala immediately prior to the preparations for the 
coup.”69 Yet, despite its lack of preparation, the CIA still managed to achieve a regime 
change. Utilizing an “intensive paramilitary and psychological campaign,” PBSUCCESS 
replaced “a popular, elected government with a political nonentity.”70 
Once again, the CIA and the Eisenhower Administration patted themselves on the 
back while declaring outright victory. This “triumph confirmed the belief of many in the 
Eisenhower administration that covert operations offered a safe, inexpensive substitute 
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for armed force in resisting Communist inroads in the Third World.”71 However, as with 
TPAJAX, the results of the operation would lead to further complications. 
The aftermath of PBSUCCESS did not result in the same long-term adversarial 
relationship that TPAJAX produced, but the consequences of the coup were embarrassing 
to the United States nonetheless. Within three years of the coup, Arbenz’s successor was 
assassinated, resulting in decades of dictatorships and turmoil in Guatemala.72 The CIA’s 
own website contains literature describing the coup as “shameful,” due to the years of 
oppression that followed.73 Thanks to American involvement in the coup, other countries 
viewed any American activity abroad with suspicion. Eisenhower himself never showed 
any remorse for the violence and destruction resulting from PBSUCCESS, leading 
President Bill Clinton finally to apologize to the Guatemalan people during a 1999 
visit.74 
The tactical successes claimed for TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS emboldened the 
American government to continue its use of unconventional warfare in various forms 
over the next five decades. Scholars have noted that the perceived achievements of 
TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS were primary contributors to later decisions to conduct UW 
operations such as the Bay of Pigs.75 As the Cold War accelerated, with both the Soviet 
Union and the United States rapidly achieving new technologies capable of wiping each 
other out completely, Eisenhower and his successors were lured into the false belief that 
unconventional warfare was a viable policy option and strategy that could stop the spread 
of communism without resulting in World War III. Like the coups in Iran and Guatemala, 
the operations that followed would occasionally yield what appeared to be immediate 
success, only to later lead to complications and embarrassment for the United States. 
Indeed, after the perceived success of TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS, the United 
States spent the next four decades investing in unconventional warfare campaigns, mainly 
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as part of the continued effort to stop the spread of communism. In 2009, the United 
States John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School released the publication, A 
Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare. This handbook is designed to offer a 
quick overview of UW, but also includes nearly six pages of UW history. The author, 
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Mark Grdovic, lists UW campaigns from the end of World 
War II through the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The details of each of these campaigns are 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is interesting to note how he describes each effort. 
Some of the campaigns listed by Grdovic include: 
 The CIA in Tibet (1955–1969) – Grdovic calls this a well-executed 
campaign, but notes that “no level of tactical success in Tibet could defeat 
the Chinese.” By the end of this effort, the U.S. had abandoned the 
Tibetan resistance forces in order to re-establish diplomatic relations with 
China.76 
 The CIA in Indonesia (1957–1958) – This campaign came on the heels 
of TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS as the U.S. government tried to support a 
coup in a country that “was not considered a belligerent state.”77 Grdovic 
notes that, “During the course of the support effort, direct American 
support was exposed several times causing embarrassment to the United 
States.”78 After a U.S. pilot was shot down and captured by Indonesian 
forces, Eisenhower tried to disavow knowledge by describing the pilot as a 
mercenary.79 The campaign was soon shut down, with the United States 
embarrassed once again as its involvement in the coup was exposed. The 
revelation of U.S. involvement also provided Achmed Sukarno, the very 
person the CIA was attempting to overthrow, the opportunity to extort 
food and weapons from the U.S. in exchange for silence about the event.80 
 CIA in Cuba and the Bay of Pigs (1961) – Probably the best known of 
any Cold War UW efforts, this operation ended in failure when Fidel 
Castro crushed an uprising of Cuban exiles organized by the United States. 
Grdovic notes that, “operational security in the United States was a 
complete failure”81 in the lead up to the operation itself.  
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 CIA and Special Forces in North Vietnam (1961–1964) – Here was 
another embarrassment for the United States, overshadowed only by the 
difficulties that would emerge with the escalation of the Vietnam War. 
The CIA attempted to establish networks in North Vietnam, but only 
managed to produce an infiltrated operation full of double agents.82 
Special Forces became involved and helped parachute the agents into 
North Vietnam.83 Incredibly, after inserting the agents, all support was cut 
off, with efforts shifting towards information operations aimed at 
convincing the North Vietnamese that there was a resistance force present 
amongst its people.84 
 CIA and Special Forces in Nicaragua and Honduras (1980–1988) – 
Another UW failure, this campaign suffered from a lack of legitimate 
resistance forces. Grdovic explains that the Contras were more paid 
mercenaries than actual revolutionaries concerned about their country.85 
This campaign was also undermined by operational security issues. The 
Iran-Contra scandal exposed what was supposed to be a covert operation, 
once again embarrassing the United States and causing it to terminate 
operations.86 
 CIA and Special Forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan (1980–1991) – 
This operation resulted in some of the worst long-term consequences of 
any UW campaign. After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the U.S. started 
funneling money, weapons, and training to groups of Islamic freedom 
fighters known as the mujahedeen. While the mujahedeen successfully 
engaged the Soviets in a long guerrilla war, the aftermath quickly spun out 
of control. Following the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan was plunged 
into a civil war, with some mujahedeen forming the Taliban and seizing 
control of the government. The Taliban would eventually welcome Osama 
bin Laden and al-Qaeda (AQ) into the country, allowing Afghanistan to be 
used as a planning base for the 9/11 attacks. Fifteen years after those 
attacks, the U.S. remains engaged in Afghanistan, spending money and 
lives fighting the Taliban. 
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IV. SPECIAL FORCES MOVES TO OFFENSIVE 
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
As the CIA began to wage offensive unconventional warfare against communists, 
Special Forces’ role remained to conduct UW only during a time of war. SF’s journey to 
embrace offensive UW took decades. One sees this transition not only in the changing 
doctrinal definition of unconventional warfare, but in several key events as well. 
A. FROM GUERRILLA WARFARE TO AN OFFENSIVE ASYMMETRIC 
OPTION  
As previously mentioned, after reaching a stalemate with the CIA over roles and 
responsibilities, SF added the term “unconventional warfare” to their doctrine in 1955. In 
1961, the Army associated the relatively new Special Forces with guerrilla warfare, or 
resistance operations,87 reflected in the title of its special operations field manual, 
Guerrilla Warfare and Special Operations. The doctrinal definition of unconventional 
warfare in this field manual was designed to encompass the entirety of a resistance 
movement,88 to include the underground and auxiliary elements, in addition to the 
guerrillas:  
Unconventional warfare consists of the interrelated fields of guerrilla 
warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states 
(resistance). Unconventional warfare operations are conducted in enemy 
or enemy controlled territory by predominately indigenous personnel 
usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.89  
Additionally, the manual notes that, “guerrilla warfare is the responsibility of the 
U.S. Army.”90 A hard line had thus been drawn between the components of a resistance, 
with Army Special Forces only being expected to work with the guerrilla portion. 
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In 1965, the Army tried to convey the infeasibility of orchestrating a resistance 
movement while only being responsible for the guerrillas.91 Doctrine writers again noted 
that “guerrilla warfare is the responsibility of the U.S. Army,”92 but this time added that 
“within certain designated geographic areas (guerrilla warfare operational areas), U.S. 
Army Special Forces must be prepared to assume responsibility for all three interrelated 
fields of unconventional warfare.”93 The Army was clearly trying to open the door for its 
Special Forces personnel to be involved in the entirety of a resistance movement, instead 
of just training guerrilla fighters. 
However, the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961 had already made the Army wary of 
involving Department of Defense personnel in offensive UW.94 In 1964, SF’s 
involvement in North Vietnam briefly provided two major lessons to the Army: (1) There 
are prerequisite conditions required for UW, and (2) Waging UW against an indigenous 
government is very different from using UW against a foreign occupier (something the 
CIA learned from its failed efforts).95 However, these lessons were quickly forgotten as 
American involvement in Vietnam increased. Special Forces spent the majority of the 
war in a counterinsurgency (COIN) role blended with foreign internal defense (FID), 
while some members of the Special Operations Group (SOG) conducted direct action 
missions. By the end of the Vietnam War, there was seemingly little to no interest 
remaining in UW.96 
For the next 25 years, the doctrinal definition of UW changed very little, 
continuing to focus predominantly on the guerrilla warfare portion of a resistance 
movement. However, as the Cold War came to an end, unconventional warfare was given 
a revised definition and meaning for the Department of Defense. In a 1990 field manual, 
UW is defined as:  
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A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of 
long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces 
who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying 
degrees by an external source. UW includes guerilla warfare (GW) and 
other direct offensive low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as 
well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence 
collection, and evasion and escape (E&E).97 
The field manual then goes on to list as a fact that “SF can conduct UW in 
conflict or war.”98 To ensure that it is clear that SF is now embracing UW outside of 
declared war, the Field Manual also introduces “Contemporary” UW, a precursor for 
today’s descriptions of “Modern” UW: 
Contemporary UW takes on new significance for several reasons. 
Historically, SF has focused on UW as an adjunct to general war. 
However, the new U.S. policy of supporting selected anti-communist 
resistance movements requires SF to focus on UW during conflicts short 
of war. Moreover, global urbanization dictates a shift in emphasis from 
rural GW to all aspects of clandestine resistance.99 
The 1990 field manual for Special Forces lays claim to SF conducting 
unconventional warfare in both wartime and in peacetime, and also declares SF capable 
of conducting UW independent from conventional operations. From the vantage point of 
this thesis, this marks an important step in SF’s evolving view of UW as an offensive 
tool. 
However, the 1990 manual fails to account for the complexities of the UW 
mission. It states explicitly that, “SF units do not create resistance movements. They 
provide advice, training and assistance to indigenous resistance organizations already in 
existence.”100 The military viewed UW as a reactive measure, focusing on pockets of 
resistance that would likely form in crisis areas. The proactive form of UW articulated in 
the 1990 field manual would require very different procedures, particularly in terms of 
finding and contacting viable resistance forces. However, even after the 1990 field 
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manual was published, “the corresponding capabilities were not developed due to a lack 
of understanding of what this [UW outside of declared war] entails.”101 
Shortly before the 9/11 attacks, an updated Special Forces Operations Field 
Manual was produced. In it, the definition of UW remains almost identical to the 1990 
version, but the 2001 manual pushes the concept of UW even further towards preemptive 
offensive action. The manual discusses mobilizing a populace against a “hostile 
government,” in addition to an “occupying power.”102 The manual distinguishes between 
partisans and insurgents, with partisans being those resistance members who oppose an 
occupying power, while insurgents target their efforts at existing governments.103 The 
manual also discusses UW across a broad spectrum of conflict, and notes that it can be 
used anywhere along that spectrum, thereby reinforcing the idea that SF can (and should) 
conduct UW in situations short of declared war.  
Published only months before 9/11 and the highly publicized SF success stories 
that would follow, the manual reminds its readers that Army SF has a place in defense 
strategy as much as conventional forces:  
Just as the UW forces of potential adversaries have gained in relevance 
and importance, so has Army SF—the UW force of the United States. SF 
provides an effective capability to counter the emerging unconventional 
threat, as well as an increasingly viable and offensive asymmetric option 
for employing U.S. military power.104 
With this statement, SF identifies itself not just as the UW force of the Army, or 
even of the Department of Defense, but as the UW force of the entire United States. This 
means that after repeatedly changing the definition of unconventional warfare, by 2001 
SF was claiming in its doctrine a mission that had traditionally belonged exclusively to 
the CIA.  
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B. SPECIAL FORCES TAKE THE LEAD: AFGHANISTAN, 2001 
In the days immediately following 9/11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
looked to United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and its commander, General 
Tommy Franks, for a response to the attacks. Franks and his staff quickly realized that 
they had no existing plans to conduct ground operations in Afghanistan, where Osama 
bin Laden and the rest of al-Qaeda were based.105 While the Department of Defense 
struggled to find ways to infiltrate Afghanistan, the CIA presented its own plan to 
President George W. Bush, proposing an unconventional warfare campaign using CIA 
assets, airpower, special operations teams, and indigenous Afghan forces.106 
CIA operatives received Special Forces Operational Detachment – Alphas 
(ODAs) on the ground in Afghanistan and linked them up with warlords and fighters 
from the Northern Alliance. The ODAs, from 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 
coordinated airstrikes while accompanying and advising their Afghan partners in battles 
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban government. The result was a stunning tactical success. 
Within weeks, the Taliban had been driven from power as bin Laden fled the area and 
went into hiding. 
Back in the United States, the first images from the newly declared “Global War 
on Terrorism” were riveting. Instead of the stereotypical soldiers with close-cropped hair 
and matching uniforms being accompanied by armored vehicles and tanks, Americans 
saw something much different. Green Berets with long hair and shaggy beards, wearing 
baseball hats instead of helmets and civilian hiking shoes instead of combat boots, rode 
on horses alongside their Afghan partners. Not only had Special Forces and the CIA 
successfully overthrown a sitting government, but they had done so with the full approval 
of the international community.  
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C. OPERATION VIKING HAMMER: UW AS A SUPPORTING EFFORT TO 
A PREEMPTIVE ATTACK 
Before the dust had even settled in Afghanistan, CENTCOM planners were 
ordered by the Bush Administration to prepare for an invasion of Iraq. Still riding a wave 
of international support and sympathy from the 9/11 attacks, President Bush declared Iraq 
as a member of an “Axis of Evil” in his 2002 State of the Union address, and mobilized a 
“Coalition of the Willing” to support the upcoming invasion. 
As part of the plan to invade Iraq, Task Force (TF) VIKING was assembled to tie 
up Iraqi forces north of Baghdad, while conventional forces invaded from the south.107 
TF VIKING was a massive undertaking, infiltrating 42 ODAs into northern Iraq, most of 
them from 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne).108 The ODAs quickly linked up with 
Kurdish forces and, after defeating Ansar al Islam irregulars, seized the cities of Kirkuk 
and Mosul. While American news networks focused mainly on the conventional assault 
force coming in through southern Iraq, TF VIKING proved to be yet another success-
against-all-odds story for Special Forces. Making use of roughly 50,000 Kurdish 
Peshmerga fighters, TF VIKING effectively neutralized 13 Iraqi divisions and took two 
of the largest cities in Iraq.109  
D. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE MEETS THE BUSH DOCTRINE 
The success of SF in Afghanistan and Iraq reinvigorated discussions about UW, 
and what SF’s UW role should be. In 2003, the definition of UW remained very similar 
to its 1990 and 2001 versions: 
A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, predominantly 
conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, 
trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an 
external source. UW includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare 
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(GW), sabotage, subversion, intelligence activities, and unconventional 
assisted recovery (UAR).110 
One difference in context, however, is that the United States was on a warpath in 
2003. The Bush Administration’s response to 9/11 had become heavily influenced by a 
group of neoconservatives whose philosophy was centered around utilizing preemptive 
force to promote American values around the globe.111 This thinking found favor with 
President Bush, and became enshrined in the 2002 National Security Strategy. What 
became known as the “Bush Doctrine” lent primacy to preemptive warfare—waging war 
against state and non-state actors in order to prevent them from attacking the United 
States first. “Waging preventive war to overthrow recalcitrant regimes and free the 
oppressed—this had become the definitive expression of America’s calling.”112 
Of course, freeing the oppressed is what the Special Forces Regiment is supposed 
to be all about. Yet, after the successful invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the rebuilding 
of each country took a dark turn. Insurgencies blossomed and networks of irregulars, 
generally described as “terrorists” by the American government, began launching attacks 
on civilians and deployed American troops. As the Department of Defense and the 
conventional military struggled to (re)learn counterinsurgency, elements of the SOF 
community that specialized in counterterrorism (CT) techniques found their niche. 
Kinetic, direct action operations emerged as the preferred mission across SOF, to include 
for Green Berets whose role had previously been envisioned as that of trainers and 
advisors as opposed to “door kickers” and assault troops. 
Observing how various SOF elements were likely to continue to be employed in 
the Global War on Terror, discussions began at the United States Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC) about whether the definition of unconventional 
warfare needed to be clarified. Mark Grdovic notes that leaders in the Special Forces 
community worried that SF was being pushed to the side as the wars in Afghanistan and 
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Iraq increasingly focused on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, and as other SOF 
elements grew in prominence: 
Despite a long resume of experience in COIN and CT (Vietnam, El 
Salvador, the Philippians, etc.), many in the SF community saw the lack of 
pending UW missions in the next stages of the Global War On Terror as a 
risk to the continued relevance of SF. This thinking was the catalyst for 
the flawed arguments to change UW to include operations against 
terrorists and insurgents. This perspective failed to account for existing 
charter that included CT and FID (to include COIN) as primary missions 
for SF, as well as a misunderstanding of the environmental conditions and 
associated activities required to conduct UW successfully. Leaders in the 
community became more interested in figuring out how to relabel these 
types of efforts as UW and claim a proprietary ownership to the 
methodology of working alongside irregular forces.113 
Instead of focusing on what SF could do to contribute in a CT or COIN campaign, 
leaders tried to find ways to make UW fit within the CT plan against al-Qaeda.114 In 
theory, this would bring SF back to the center of the conversation, since SF now claimed 
itself to be the country’s UW force. However, instead of clarifying SF’s role under the 
Bush Doctrine, reconceiving UW simply generated more debate. Proponents saw UW as 
a more appropriate way to wage the CT fight, while opponents began to ask what, if 
anything, actually differentiated UW from CT.115 
All of this was occurring during a time when many in the military community 
came to view the preemptive offense embodied by the Bush Doctrine as the new norm. 
America had been attacked, there were two wars underway, and a nearly blank check had 
been given to the military to wage those wars.116 As the different branches of the military 
sought continued relevance and funding, each sought to stay as involved as possible in 
the ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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Meanwhile, in 2007, the definition of UW was changed again. To try and make 
UW more relevant to the ongoing counterterrorism and counterinsurgency fights, the 
definition became, “Operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support 
of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations.”117 
Proponents of this new definition, which now included “irregular forces,” hoped that this 
would put SF back in the lead.118 Working with irregular forces is a hallmark of the 
Green Berets. However, this latest version of the definition also included conventional 
military operations, which allowed UW to apply to nearly any operation being executed 
with a partner force. 
As a result, other SOF units began to add UW to the lists of their core tasks. The 
reality at the time was that nearly every military element deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq 
was working with surrogates in one form or another, to include the conventional military. 
For instance, when the Sunni Awakening began in Iraq in 2007, conventional infantry 
units found themselves working with Sunni militias—or irregulars. This meant that, 
according to the doctrinal definition of UW, regular infantry units were conducting UW 
on a daily basis. 
Interestingly, the 2007 definition of UW was internally produced and never 
approved by the Army doctrine writers at Ft. Leavenworth.119 It was eventually 
rescinded, but caused considerable, lasting damage. For instance, in 2016, while 
attending a Naval War College course for joint accreditation, my class received a 
capabilities brief for U.S. Navy SEALs. Despite the SEALs being a force primarily 
dedicated to maritime interdiction, the capabilities brief listed unconventional warfare as 
one of their core competencies. According to the 2007 definition, SEALs too could claim 
unconventional warfare as an area of expertise after working extensively with Iraqi and 
Afghan partner units. 
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E. THE CURRENT DEFINITION OF UW EMERGES 
In 2009 came a new American foreign policy. President Barack Obama was 
elected to office, having run on the promise to end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
to avoid committing U.S. troops and resources to messy nation-building campaigns. 
President Obama’s campaign promises were a direct repudiation of the Bush Doctrine. 
Already, USASOC had begun to realize its 2007 definition of UW was causing 
major issues. The constant reinterpretation of UW was costing the force clarity. In 
response, a working group of about 10 people was formed to try and re-clarify the 
definition once and for all.120 The result of the working group’s effort is reflected in the 
current joint doctrinal definition of UW: Activities to enable a resistance movement or 
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by 
operating with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area. 
Members of the working group crafted their definition to include only very 
specific activities, limiting what could be considered unconventional warfare. Emphasis 
was instead placed on the purpose of unconventional warfare. However, their definition 
still showed traces of the preemptive warfare thinking that had dominated the Global War 
on Terror strategy for nearly a decade. The new definition restored the UW partner force 
to being a resistance movement or insurgency, and utilized language that allowed for the 
use of offensive unconventional warfare. By stating that the goal was to “coerce, disrupt, 
or overthrow an occupying power or government,” the definition allowed for the 
possibility that UW could be used as a tool for preemptive regime change against an 
undesirable government, which rendered it nearly identical in concept to the CIA’s covert 
operations during the Cold War. 
The language used in the definition is just ambiguous enough that if one wants to 
engage in Jedburgh-style unconventional warfare, one can focus on an occupying power 
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as the target of UW. However, one sovereign nation rarely invades and occupies another 
in today’s world.121 This leads to greater focus on the words overthrow and government.  
Some members of the working group thought the inclusion of the word overthrow 
would be politically disastrous.122 The more palatable trio of “coerce, disrupt, or defeat” 
was suggested instead, but defeat was determined to be too difficult to quantify.123 
Consequently, overthrow was used, helping to form the perception that SF, the UW force 
of the United States, exists to utilize proxy forces to overthrow sitting governments. 
Ironically, had this same definition been produced in 2003 or 2004, it would have 
fit perfectly with the American foreign policy mindset at the time. However, generating it 
in 2009 yielded the opposite: the Obama Administration entered office looking to avoid 
military conflict, not to start it. USASOC had just defined the parameters of a task that 
nobody in the Obama Administration seemed eager to embrace. When one considers 
some of the problems that have emerged in the wake of offensive unconventional warfare 
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V. PROBLEMS WITH OFFENSIVE UW AND UW IN 
THE GRAY ZONE 
Any military officer can almost certainly quote the tired and overused Clausewitz 
phrase that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” It is a simple and 
obvious statement, especially when looking at an American-style democracy. The role of 
senior military leaders is to provide sound advice about how to prosecute wars. The 
military does not decide when and where to wage those war, but is instead directed by its 
civilian (and political) masters.  
For instance, if the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff entered the Oval Office 
and advocated for using a nuclear first-strike option to deal with the Syrian Civil War or 
Russian aggression in Ukraine, he would not only be laughed out of the room, but likely 
relieved of his duties for providing poor advice. It seems a ridiculous scenario, but 
illustrates how the Chairman and other senior military leaders must provide valid and 
feasible options in order to have their advice listened to and considered by civilian 
policymakers. Consequently, two questions the material presented thus far should raise 
are: With unconventional warfare’s long history of embarrassing failures, is it a feasible 
option to present? Should a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff walk into the Oval 
Office and confidently recommend UW as a policy option?  
To properly analyze the problems posed by unconventional warfare as a modern-
day policy option, we must split UW into two types. This thesis has referred to the first 
type as offensive UW—coercing, disrupting, or overthrowing a government without 
declaring war in order to further the interests of the United States. This includes 
discussions about UW in the “gray zone.” The second type pertains to the execution of 
UW during a declared conflict or war. One might call this defensive UW, so long as the 
United States is responding to an aggressor or occupying power.  
A. THE COVERT PROBLEM 
Most historical examples listed in UW manuals are actually CIA covert 
operations, meant to conceal U.S. sponsorship. This raises several questions. First, 
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whether UW has to be covert in nature. If the answer to that question is yes, it raises the 
subsequent question: is the Department of Defense capable of conducting covert action? 
1. Does It Have to Be Covert? 
The Joint Publication on UW states that, “UW requires a varying mix of 
clandestine and overt sponsor activities and may require covert activities to hide the role 
of the USG as the sponsor.”124 The problem with this statement is the fact that nearly 
every past UW campaign conducted outside a theater of war began as a covert operation.  
In accordance with today’s definition, the purpose of UW in an offensive scenario 
would be to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow another government. Exposing U.S. 
sponsorship of these activities when the U.S. has not declared war has been, and will 
continue to be, massively embarrassing for the United States. The U.S. projects itself 
around the world as a promoter of democracy and contends that people should have the 
right to choose their own government. If the U.S. is caught interfering in someone else’s 
government, that makes the “shining city on the hill” narrative much harder to sustain. 
Russia is currently providing an example of what happens when you get caught 
coercing or disrupting another government. On 07 October 2016, the U.S. Director of 
National Intelligence released a statement directly accusing the Russian government of 
orchestrating a string of email hacks on high-level political organizations and persons.125 
It has now become apparent that Russia worked directly with Julian Assange’s 
WikiLeaks to release those hacked emails in a manner that undermined the 2016 
presidential election by attempting to sow doubts in the minds of the American populace 
about their political process.  
The email leaks were aimed exclusively at the Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) and the campaign staff of Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton. Democrats, 
however, were not the only ones to express their outrage over Russian intervention. 
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Neoconservatives like Max Boot and Bill Kristol, proponents of U.S. intervention abroad, 
have expressed their outrage over Russia’s attempt to coerce and disrupt the U.S. 
government.126 Republican Senators Ben Sasse and Marco Rubio also denounced the 
WikiLeaks attacks, and called on their party to do the same. 
Now, imagine that the situation was reversed. Say the U.S. decided to do in 
Russia what it did in Italy in the late 1940s. What would the international response be if 
Russia’s intelligence agencies traced email hacks and political interference back to the 
United States? Could the U.S. president continue to travel the world advocating for free 
elections and democracy if the U.S. was exposed as having actively interfered in 
someone else’s political process? 
Arguably, this is already happening. The U.S. executed regime changes in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya over the past 15 years, yet still lays claim to the moral high 
ground internationally. The problems that can emerge from this claim can be seen in 
Turkish President Recep Erdogan’s response to U.S. efforts trying to keep Turkey from 
becoming overly involved in the battle for Mosul. “Erdogan noted that some countries 
were telling Turkey . . . to stay out. Yet, despite not having history in the region or 
connection to it, these same countries were ‘coming and going.’ ‘Did Saddam [Hussein] 
tell the United States to come to Iraq 14 years ago?’ he added.”127  
The consequences of getting caught conducting unconventional warfare and 
manipulating other governments all but confirm that UW has to be covert if it is to be 
successfully executed outside the bounds of declared war. This leads to the next 
problem—can the Department of Defense effectively conduct covert operations without 
being discovered? 
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2. Everybody Wants a Book Deal 
When President Obama announced to the world that Osama bin Laden had been 
killed in a raid, his speech did no more than acknowledge that the raid was executed by 
“a small team of Americans.”128 Yet, within 24 hours, leaks were emerging from the 
White House that a group from SEAL Team Six was responsible. 
As details of the story continued to emerge, it was not only learned that SEAL 
Team Six executed the raid, but that the assault force had been hand-picked from within 
the unit.129 The assaulters on this mission were supposed to be quite literally the “best of 
the best.” SEAL Team Six itself is one of the most secretive units in the United States 
military. Surely operational security could be ensured by hand-picking the assault force 
and including only the most mature and professional operators. 
However, just over a year after the raid, assaulter Matt Bissonnette published his 
book, No Easy Day, under the pseudonym Mark Owen. The book was a tell-all about the 
raid and was immediately controversial since it came from a community that is supposed 
to value quiet professionalism. Not to be outdone, fellow-SEAL Robert O’Neill had to 
tell his story to Esquire magazine and the Fox News Channel, and is now earning his 
livelihood as a paid speaker who talks about his career as a SEAL and as “the man who 
killed bin Laden.” 
O’Neill and Bissonnette both claim that they just want the public to know the 
truth in response to controlled leaks of information from the Obama Administration, to 
include cooperation with filmmakers on the production of Zero Dark Thirty.130 Yet their 
inability to keep silent raises an important question—does the U.S. military possess the 
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capability to execute a covert operation without its participants talking about it 
afterwards? 
While it is impossible to prove that the military cannot find individuals capable of 
conducting a covert operation and remaining silent, one needs only to peruse the 
“Military” section in any Barnes and Nobles bookstore to find dozens of tell-all memoirs 
written by the special operations community. The number of special operations personnel 
without a Facebook page or Twitter account is dwindling. The Special Forces battalion 
that I was previously assigned to has its own Facebook page, open to the public, despite 
containing pictures of members of the unit and their families. Websites like 
SOFREP.com and Facebook’s Operator As F*** have emerged, giving special operations 
personnel forums in which they talk about their exploits and complain about current 
government and military leaders.131 Should civilian leaders who might be looking for an 
organization to conduct covert unconventional warfare be wary of selecting military 
personnel from units that have developed a reputation for violating the quiet professional 
principle? 
B. THE AMERICAN VALUES PROBLEM 
George Marshall’s objection to having the State Department run covert operations 
was his belief that any ability to conduct diplomacy would be compromised by his 
organization’s meddling in other governments’ affairs. He feared that the U.S. would be 
seen as promoting a certain set of values abroad, while executing operations that directly 
conflicted with those same values.  
Alberto Coll and Richard Shultz link this concern to principles espoused by the 
Founding Fathers: “Although they established the nation on the doctrine of universal 
natural rights, they did not believe that our foreign policy should seek to transform all 
those nations that did not accept this as the basis of government.”132 They note that the 
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fundamental American principle is that everyone is equal, so no one has the right to 
dictate what form of government another person should live under.133 
Tellingly, while he was initially a proponent of unconventional warfare, George 
Kennan ultimately dismissed it as being in direct violation of American principles.134 
George Ball likewise expressed his concern that if the U.S. participated in unconventional 
warfare, it would be no different than the Soviet Union.135 Ball explicitly lists 
“noninterference in the affairs of other nations, respect for their sovereignty and self-
determination” as some of the important American principles that would be compromised 
by conducting unconventional warfare.136 
The counterargument to this concern over American values was presented to 
President Eisenhower in a report from Lieutenant General James Doolittle in 1954.137 
The “Doolittle Standard” declared that communism (and by extension the Soviet Union) 
posed an existential threat to the United States, therefore no rules should apply in 
combatting it.138 This “standard” is said to have been the justification used by 
Eisenhower and subsequent presidents when they assented to unconventional warfare. 
It is impossible to determine whether the formation of communist governments in 
Third World countries posed a true existential threat to the United States, since relatively 
few succumbed to communism. However, trying to apply the Doolittle Standard today 
does not seem to work. Russia remains an adversary of the United States, but appears to 
be more focused on gaining influence in Eastern Europe and parts of the Middle East 
than militarily threatening the U.S. Radical Islamic terrorism has resulted in the tragic 
death of American citizens, but has never actually threatened the existence of the United 
States. An argument can be made that today’s international stage simply does not justify 
the United States disregarding its own values in order to save itself from perceived 
extermination. 
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C. THE GRAY ZONE 
A white paper published in 2015 by U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) described the gray zone as consisting of “competitive interactions among 
and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace 
duality.”139 The paper goes on to quote John F. Kennedy’s address to the graduating class 
of West Point in 1962, when he described a “type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in 
its origin.”140 In other words, despite the recent emergence of the term, the gray zone is 
nothing new, and has been around for quite some time (or at least since 1962). In fact, 
conducting unconventional warfare in the gray zone has been occurring since the start of 
the Cold War. Indeed, the Cold War itself can be described as almost exclusively a gray 
zone competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, with unconventional 
warfare in the Third World serving as both countries’ weapon of choice. The use of UW 
was meant to avoid conflict spilling out of the gray zone and into a full-blown 
conventional or nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviets. 
One problem that arises from conducting UW in the gray zone is that the 
consequences of the action are unpredictable. For instance, the CIA’s support of the 
mujahedeen in Afghanistan is often cited as a successful case of gray zone UW; the usual 
contention is that it began “a chain of events that eventually resulted in the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.”141 However, as previously mentioned, this 
chain of events also resulted in creating a safe-haven for al-Qaeda, from where AQ 
planned its attacks against the United States, in addition to setting the conditions for what 
has become the longest war in U.S. history. In other words, and as this “success” reveals, 
the second and third order effects of coercing, disrupting, or overthrowing other 
governments cannot be predicted, and have historically resulted in the creation of more 
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problems for the United States. Indeed, “from the perspective of the assistance providers, 
unexpected outcomes are the rule rather than the exception.”142 
Often, arguments for UW in the gray zone end up contradicting themselves. As an 
example, while addressing the historical failures of UW, Will Irwin notes that, “proactive 
political and unconventional warfare can be enormously effective in furthering U.S. 
interests. History shows, on the other hand, that limited, reactive, poorly timed, non-
wartime UW efforts rarely succeed.”143 This quote appears at the beginning of a paper 
that argues for unconventional warfare preparations within the gray zone—that period of 
time that does not constitute “wartime”—even though, non-wartime is the very time 
when UW is most likely to fail. Additionally, the Jedburghs were successful despite 
conducting operations that were both limited and reactive. 
The prescriptive analysis portion of Irwin’s argument nevertheless still has merit, 
especially when he considers the analysis required to prepare for UW: 
Because timing plays such a decisively important role in UW, the ability 
to recognize and act upon indicators of UW windows of opportunity is 
imperative. This calls for an estimative intelligence capability focused 
specifically on structured and continual analysis of the prospects for or 
existence of internal dissent in the face of authoritarian rule. We must 
become much better at not only recognizing the conditions for domestic 
unrest (the potential for state instability), but at detecting the presence of 
nascent clandestine opposition, the emerging shape and scope of that 
opposition, the character and agenda of its leadership, the substance of its 
narrative, and the pace and trajectory of its development. An early and 
growing in-depth understanding of such a movement can help determine if 
a benefactor-proxy relationship would serve U.S. interests.144 
Irwin argues that by proactively understanding and identifying the potential for 
unconventional warfare, senior leaders can better equip themselves to “sell 
unconventional warfare as a viable foreign policy option in a given situation.”145 
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Irwin continues his argument for proactive, preparatory UW by echoing Kermit 
Roosevelt’s explanation for success in TPAJAX: thorough and detailed analysis of the 
target population, with a solid understanding of the society itself.146 This involves 
“mapping the human terrain,” or identifying all of the factions that exist within a 
population:  
Religious sects and factions, diaspora populations, kinship networks, 
human rights groups, the urban poor and other underprivileged and 
neglected population groups, political constituencies, the media, economic 
and trade elites, corruption victim groups, political activists, women’s 
rights groups, trade unions, teacher associations, student activist groups, 
veterans’ organizations, and activist clergy groups. Simmering ethnic, 
clan, or geographical tensions and rivalries need to be fully appreciated.147 
To accomplish this, a never-ending process of analysis must be used to 
continuously update the United States’ understanding of vulnerable populations. Such 
ethnographic sensing would also allow “discrete contact with an inchoate movement—
still in the latent and incipient stages of development,” in order to begin shaping the 
movement into the United States’ desired resistance.148  
On paper, preparatory actions for resistance make sense. By the time one reaches 
the moment of decision for initiating an unconventional warfare campaign or operation, it 
is too late to successfully conduct preparatory actions to understand a target population. 
However, the feasibility of the United States conducting this preparation continuously 
around the world is doubtful. 
Historian Max Boot and former Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick point out that the 
U.S. military’s largest current deficit is its “lack of knowledge about other cultures.”149 
Even specially selected and trained SOF personnel are faced with a potentially 
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insurmountable obstacle: with rare exception, they are outsiders attempting to understand 
and then coerce or influence a population to which they do not belong. 
In order to assist a movement or social network in another country, a third party 
must cultivate at least some level of trust, to include person-based trust.150 To build 
person-based trust, communication and similarity are two important factors.151 In other 
words, if you speak the language and look like the person you are dealing with, you have 
a better chance of quickly building trust with that person.  
While history contains examples of outsiders like Edward Lansdale or 
T. E. Lawrence successfully influencing local populations despite their status as 
foreigners (or in Lansdale’s case, his lack of language ability), tasking U.S. SOF to 
actively and continuously map human networks, cultivate social movements, and build 
resistance groups in the gray zone may be a step too far. The difficulty in accomplishing 
this mission is further exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. has built a special operations 
community that is overwhelmingly white and male.152 Within Special Forces, the unit 
that would be expected to conduct this preparation, roughly 85% of the officers and 
enlisted men are white.153  
This puts SF personnel at a severe disadvantage if they were to attempt to map 
human networks or cultivate movements in vulnerable populations in regions like the 
Middle East. When competing for trust and influence among Arabs, it is reasonable to 
conclude that white, Christian American SF personnel would not gain as much traction 
as, say, Americans of Arab, North African, or Muslim descent. At least the latter would 
be able to point to a shared region and religion, as opposed to the white Christian who 
grew up in the suburbs of Dallas. Again, this is far different from what was asked of the 
multi-national Jedburgh teams, or the Eastern European Lodge Act Soldiers who made up 
the bulk of 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) during the early days of the Cold War. 
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VI. DEFENSIVE UW: JUSTIFIED, BUT STILL MESSY 
The case against offensive unconventional warfare seems clear given its history. 
However, the question of whether there is a role for defensive UW remains open. For 
instance, what if a U.S. ally were suddenly occupied by another country? What if another 
government reacted to domestic protests by using its military to slaughter innocent and 
defenseless civilians? Could the U.S. effectively employ unconventional warfare to 
counter these actions, and to help “free the oppressed?” In these scenarios, UW would not 
have to be covert. Nor would American values be compromised. There would be no gray 
zone. The U.S. would be justified in its actions.  
Two such scenarios can be found in the recent actions of Syrian president Bashar 
al Assad and in those by Russian president Vladimir Putin. Assad’s response to protests 
in his country ignited a civil war, which is today approaching its sixth year. The resulting 
chaos allowed ISIS to expand out of Iraq and seize terrain in Syria. Meanwhile, Putin’s 
seizure of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent sponsorship of the war in Donbass signaled to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that Russia would not tolerate its 
eastward expansion, and also augured the possibility of similar actions against NATO’s 
Baltic State members. 
As the Syrian Civil War began, President Obama’s advisors described the 
opposition as being drawn from “the ranks of ordinary citizens,”154 which presented what 
seemed to be the perfect opportunity to utilize unconventional warfare. UW would be 
ideal for assisting an oppressed population against a dictator who proved increasingly 
willing to kill his own citizens in order to retain power. Yet, Obama declined to initiate 
an unconventional warfare campaign, saying later that, “The notion that we could have—
in a clean way that didn’t commit U.S. military forces—changed the equation on the 
ground there was never true.”155 
                                                 




There are indications that Obama’s reluctance was based in part on a historical 
analysis conducted by the CIA in 2012. As the Obama Administration grappled with how 
to proceed in dealing with Syria (note: this was before ISIS had re-emerged as a major 
player in the conflict), the CIA delivered a report to the White House that concluded that 
training and arming rebel forces usually results in failure.156 So, what problems might 
arise from conducting a form of justified, defensive UW in a place like Syria or the 
Baltics? 
A. THE DAY AFTER PROBLEM 
In a recent interview, President Obama stated that the worst mistake of his 
presidency was “failing to plan for the day after . . . in intervening in Libya.”157 This was 
an astonishing admission, given that the United States had spent the last 15 years 
watching Afghanistan and Iraq devolve into chaos thanks to the lack of a plan for “the 
day after.” UW doctrine actually covers the importance of “the day after” in its 7th 
phase—Transition—acknowledging that volatility will likely exist: 
There are no assurances, once U.S. objectives are achieved, that the 
resistance has also achieved its objectives, and is ready to cease hostilities 
. . . When the objectives include removing the hostile government or 
occupying power entirely, the U.S. support to the new government 
transitions from UW to stability operations and possibly to FID (foreign 
internal defense) or COIN (counterinsurgency). FID, or COIN is applied 
only if the ousted governing body starts its own resistance campaign 
against the newly formed transitional government. At this point, it is 
critical to shift efforts from defeating the adversary regime to protecting 
the newly installed government and its security personnel from 
insurgency, lawlessness, and subversion by former regime elements that 
attempt to organize resistance.158 
While the joint publication focuses on “former regime elements,” it fails to 
mention the possibility that external third parties may challenge the new government. 
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Yet, this is precisely what was seen when Iranian-sponsored groups launched their own 
insurgencies in Iraq after the U.S. invasion. 
The joint publication is quick to point out that transition only occurs after a “UW 
operation or campaign that proceeds to the complete overthrow of a government or the 
ousting of an occupying power.”159 If the purpose of conducting UW is limited to 
coercing or disrupting, then transition may not happen at all. The joint publication 
underscores this argument by suggesting that any relationship with resistance elements 
can simply be terminated, sent into dormancy, or given to other agencies within the U.S. 
government. 
History has revealed the transition phase to be the most difficult, and likely the 
most important, phase of a conflict. For instance, TPAJAX’s transition plan installed a 
leader who was viewed as an American puppet by his own people. Operational planners 
failed to consider the long-term effects of overthrowing a democratically elected 
government, leading to an eventual revolution against the Shah. Likewise, those behind 
PBSUCCESS failed to account for the consolidation of power and the oppression of the 
Guatemalan people that occurred in the subsequent years. 
As for the joint publication’s claim that relationships with insurgents can simply 
be terminated or laid to rest, a very recent example reminds us of the dangers involved in 
abandoning a resistance after you have cultivated it. In the months following 1991’s First 
Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush publicly called for the Iraqi people to rise up in 
rebellion against Saddam Hussein. Kurdish and Shia forces heeded this call and 
attempted to oust the Baathist regime, only to have the United States pull its support. 
Hussein crushed both insurgencies, creating a Kurdish exodus that the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees at the time called the largest in its 40-year history.160 The 
U.S. then spent the next 12 years enforcing no-fly zones over Northern and Southern 
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Iraq, spending money and resources to prevent Saddam Hussein from completely 
exterminating what remained of the resistance Washington had encouraged. 
Admittedly, “the day after” problem is not limited to unconventional warfare, but 
is applicable to any type of U.S. intervention. The inability to predict what will take the 
place of a deposed government continues to plague policy makers and academic scholars, 
and has been said to have paralyzed the Obama Administration’s current response to the 
Syrian crisis. Harvard professor Stephen Walt summarizes some of the rationale for not 
intervening:  
In particular, I’ve yet to see any of the advocates of intervention lay out a 
plausible blueprint for a post-civil war political order in Syria and a 
plausible path for getting there. The United States remains committed to 
dismantling Bashar al-Assad’s regime (for reasons that are not hard to 
understand), but we lack a serious notion of what will replace it. Needless 
to say, this was the key omission when we invaded Iraq and when we 
helped topple Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya: Getting rid of the bad guy 
and his henchman was the easy part, but we hadn’t the foggiest notion of 
what to put in their place.161 
Despite the degree to which transition challenges should be a major source of 
concern for decision makers, some advocates attempt to sell UW by simply ignoring the 
requirement for transition altogether. In a recent article advocating for UW in the gray 
zone, two members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) write that “UW 
provides the U.S. with the capability to deal with a foreign adversary without having to 
own the foreign terrain and the associated entanglements after the conflict is over.”162 
Yet, as already noted, unconventional warfare doctrine acknowledges that “associated 
entanglements” occupy an entire phase of UW operations. Even if it were the intent of the 
U.S. to simply walk away, this does not mean that others, either participants or 
opponents, would allow that to happen in a clean and simple manner. 
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Reviewing some of the arguments for nation-building helps illustrate additional 
complexities and pitfalls inherent to “the day after” problem. For instance, in a 2016 
article, Max Boot and Michael Miklaucic write that the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) should be reconfigured in order to nation-build across the world 
in troubled countries.163 Boot and Miklaucic also move beyond the goal of promulgating 
“American democracy for all.” They admit that democracy itself is a “luxury good in the 
developing world.”164 Consequently, they argue that the United States should be 
comfortable supporting or even building autocratic governments as long as those 
autocrats behave in a responsible manner.165 
Boot doubles down on this argument in a recent article in Commentary magazine, 
contending that the U.S. is a “nation-builder in denial,” and that more positive results 
would have occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan had the U.S. kept troops there for an 
indefinite period of time.166 However, Boot’s main point in his article is to praise another 
article that promotes nation-building, written by Nobel Prize-winning economist Roger 
B. Myerson and State Department official Kael Weston. Curiously, Myerson and Weston 
open their argument for nation-building by contradicting Boot and Miklaucic, while also 
explaining why the U.S. cannot simply install a leader of its choice as it tried to do in Iran 
and Guatemala in the 1950s: 
Trying to install some friendly autocrat after a U.S. intervention won’t 
work anymore: It would stoke distrust, invite uprisings, increase tensions 
with other major powers, and alarm many Americans unwilling to get into 
the business of permanent occupation. U.S. interests are better served by 
cultivating legitimate leaders. Today, successful state-building means 
democratic state-building.167 
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Myerson and Weston do not pretend that nation-building can happen without a 
serious expansion of government and budgets. Instead, they advise the U.S. to “staff up” 
and create “a new agency devoted explicitly to state-building missions.”168 Meanwhile, 
their solution on funding is to suggest that the new agency’s budget could be “offset with 
contributions from NATO and other allies.”169 Exactly how the United States might 
convince NATO allies (many of whom struggle to even meet their own obligations to 
NATO) to fund U.S. nation-building ventures around the world remains unaddressed in 
the article. Regardless, if the U.S. chooses to conduct UW, it seems likely that a serious 
investment and possible expansion of government would be necessary for the sole 
purpose of addressing the transition phase. However, even if this was done, no level of 
investment or infrastructure can guarantee predictable behavior from the proxy force.  
B. THE “WHO ARE WE WORKING WITH?” PROBLEM—MORAL 
ISSUES 
The current joint publication on unconventional warfare spends roughly two 
pages on transition issues in its “Planning” section, including “Notional Transition Lines 
of Effort in Unconventional Warfare.” Here, responsibility for governance is supposed to 
shift from local organizations to an established and functioning national government, 
while economic development is expected to expand from local markets to formal regional 
integration.170 Although the difficulties associated with each can be observed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, even more germane to this thesis is another line of effort: the transition of 
the guerrilla into a soldier in a professional security force. 
During Robin Sage, the culminating exercise of the Special Forces Qualification 
Course, a popular scenario is presented to students as they train their guerrillas. The 
scenario varies from class to class, but the general script involves the guerrillas 
conducting, or attempting to conduct, a human rights violation. Often, a “captured pilot” 
is dragged into the “G-Base,” and the guerrillas are eager to conduct a public execution. 
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Alternatively, students might be confronted by a guerrilla attempting to torture a prisoner 
to elicit timely intelligence. 
Regardless of the scenario, a solution usually is quickly reached. My own team 
had parachuted into the exercise with pre-made “Laws of Land Warfare” cards. We 
handed these out to our guerrillas and then conducted a short class. There were minor 
objections and some accusations of hypocrisy (U.S. detainees in Guantanamo were the 
subject of choice), but in the end, our conveniently compliant guerrillas agreed to behave 
like professional soldiers. 
In the real world, working with indigenous forces is not so easy. In late 2015, a 
small scandal erupted as news emerged that two Special Forces soldiers had been 
disciplined for beating up a local Afghan security forces commander. The Green Berets 
had discovered a litany of abuses conducted by their partner force: a militia commander 
had raped a 14-year old girl, and was subsequently “punished” by serving only one day in 
jail before being required to marry the victim.171 Other commanders stole money, raped 
their way through villages, and conducted “honor killings” of their own daughters.172 The 
issues were raised through the chain of command, but the Special Forces team was told 
leave local grievances alone, and to allow the locals to resolve them.173 
The breaking point came as the Green Berets were informed that one of their 
militia commanders had kidnapped a young boy from a local village, chained him to a 
bed, and repeatedly raped him.174 After the militia commander laughed at the Green 
Berets’ attempts to intervene and stop the behavior, they reacted physically. One of the 
Green Berets was relieved from command for striking the militia commander, while the 
Army attempted to forcibly retire the other for assisting.175 
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Being confronted by locals engaging in human rights abuses is not unique to our 
recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann 
and his fellow advisors witnessed atrocities in Vietnam while advising those who 
belonged to what was supposedly an already-professional, uniformed military force. 
Soldiers, to include officers, from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) were 
known to torture captured North Vietnamese guerillas by dislocating their shoulders, 
cutting them with Bowie knives, or forcing them to sit on the handle end of an 
entrenching tool.176 
Incidents like these do not bode well for the eventual acceptance of the security 
force by the populace after U.S. involvement ends. Indeed, this presents a major 
challenge when working with indigenous forces; while their objectives may line up with 
U.S. objectives, there is often no way to control their actions, particularly when those 
actions may be in contravention of American values or morals. 
C. THE “WHO ARE WE WORKING WITH PROBLEM?”—CAN WE 
TRUST THEM AFTER THE CONFLICT? 
The current fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq is already beginning to manifest 
related issues that come with working with indigenous forces. As the training and 
equipping of rebel forces by the Pentagon and the CIA ramped up in 2016, it was 
reported that rebels backed by the CIA were actively fighting other groups that were 
backed by the Pentagon.177 As one news report pointed out, this showed just “how little 
control U.S. intelligence officers and military planners have over the groups they have 
financed and trained.”178 
In 2013, there were roughly 1,000 armed opposition groups in Syria, comprised of 
nearly 100,000 fighters.179 A similar situation emerged in Libya after the ouster of 
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Muammar Ghadafi, with an estimated 2,000 militia groups fighting for control of the 
country.180 Given that these groups would not exist if they did not have conflicting 
agendas and interests, further complicated by differing interpretations of Islam, one has to 
wonder: which of them deserves assistance? Which should be placed into power? And 
then, will that group, or set of groups, be able to pacify the others and convince them to 
either lay down their arms or join the new government?  
When identifying a resistance or guerrilla force to work with, the assessment 
seldom includes whether or not those forces will be capable of running a government as 
the conflict abates. The primary concern, instead, is to find groups willing to take up arms 
and fight against the occupying power or hostile government. Worth asking is: are any of 
the current militia commanders in Syria and Libya capable of moving from the fighter 
role into the governance role? The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) currently receive 
support from the U.S., but consist mainly of Kurds and a small minority of Arabs.181 Will 
the Kurds have the ability or legitimacy to govern in Syria after the conflict? 
Alternatively, will they willingly lay down their arms and accept whatever Arab 
government might emerge? 
These issues illuminate a problem with reactionary UW. While its use is clearly 
justified, the issue of preparation again comes into play. With no prior knowledge of any 
of the resistance forces, the U.S. vetted its Syrian partner forces as individuals, not as 
units.182 There was no indigenous chain of command established, with a strategic leader 
on the Syrian side to vouch for the conduct of his forces.183 As a result, different groups 
with different objectives and agendas continue to compete—sometimes viciously. 
UW advocates might claim that this could be resolved via the continuous 
preparation discussed previously. However, it seems doubtful that U.S. SOF could have 
successfully mapped and vetted Syrian resistance networks prior to the outbreak of 
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conflict, or even shortly thereafter. Even had some of the resistance forces been 
previously identified and vetted, how many new groups would have still emerged? Even 
more to the point, how could those forces, some of whom are sponsored by Iran, have 
been handled by the U.S. and its resistance forces? 
D. EQUIPPING THE PARTNER FORCE—FLOODING THE 
BATTLEFIELD WITH WEAPONS 
Equipping a sponsored force can also create problems once the conflict ends. For 
example, it is estimated that over the past 15 years the U.S. provided nearly 1.5 million 
firearms (to include assault rifles, pistols, and machine guns) to Iraqi and Afghan 
forces.184 Hundreds of thousands of these weapons are no longer accounted for, though 
many have been seen in the hands of ISIS fighters in pictures and video footage.185 While 
plans for unconventional warfare call for the disarmament of guerilla fighters at the end 
of hostilities, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ensure that weapons provided by a 
sponsor do not reemerge in the hands of enemies in future conflicts.  
E. MISALIGNMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
Beyond the inability to control individual surrogate behavior, when objectives are 
not aligned between a sponsor and its proxy force, priorities will not align either. The 
United States strives to create stable, independent countries that can stand on their own. 
However, without a common adversary over the long-term, maintaining significant 
influence in another state may be impossible: 
The successful hegemon has to create dependent allies to avoid relying on 
a temporary coincidence of interests; this is particularly the case in the 
absence of long-term shared enemies. The end of the Cold War might for 
this reason have made the task of the hegemon all the more 
complicated.186 
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During the Cold War, the U.S. and its allies shared the same grievance: 
communism. However, once the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, or Afghanistan end, it is not 
clear what the United States and those it supports will continue to have in common.  
F. UW IN THE BALTICS: DEFINITELY, MAYBE 
In early 2014, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted from power. In 
the resulting chaos, it took Russia only months to annex the Crimean Peninsula and 
initiate a civil war in Eastern Ukraine. The United States defense establishment was soon 
abuzz with terms like “Little Green Men” and “Hybrid Warfare.” Russia achieved its 
objective of maintaining access to a warm-water port, while preventing Ukraine from 
aligning itself with NATO and the West, by utilizing special operations forces, 
supplemented with conventional units.187 
As Crimea was annexed and Ukraine imploded, NATO and U.S. European 
Command (EUCOM) grappled with what would come next.188 The initial prediction was 
that Russia would soon use similar techniques in the Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia, or 
Lithuania. NATO planners worried that by utilizing plain-clothed, covert SOF operatives, 
Russia could incite the same sort of chaos within a NATO country. According to the 
thinking at the time, by not undertaking conventional military action, Putin would count 
on NATO not invoking Article V, and consequently, NATO would fail to properly 
defend one of its member states. 
Nearly three years later, Russia has not fulfilled these prophecies. Instead, NATO 
responded to the fear of Russian actions splintering the Alliance by increasing combined 
exercises across Europe. For instance, at the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO announced 
that a very high readiness joint task force (VJTF) would be integrated into its NATO 
Response Force (NRF). Today, the Operations section of NATO’s webpage includes 
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“Assurance Measures,” with news about what NATO is doing to assure its member states 
that Russian aggression will not be tolerated.189  
Meanwhile, the Baltic States have taken measures into their own hands. In 
Estonia, the Estonian Defense League holds weekend military exercises and 
competitions, designed to teach its citizens how to become guerrillas in the event of an 
invasion.190 In Lithuania, authorities recently issued a manual to their citizens advising 
them on how to contribute to resistance movements against a Russian incursion.191 This 
was the third edition since the seizure of Crimea.192  
The prospect of a Russian invasion of the Baltics mirrors the threat faced by U.S. 
Special Forces soldiers in Europe early in the Cold War. As previously noted, the first 
members of 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) were meant to be stay-behind fighters 
in Europe to organize resistance movements after a Soviet invasion. So, if Russia decided 
to invade the Baltics, would UW be a viable mission for SF to conduct?  
The first response to a Russian invasion would be the invoking of Article V. 
Given the acute awareness about the techniques used in Crimea and Ukraine, there would 
be little debate today about whether the presence of “Little Green Men” meets the 
threshold for NATO members to agree that an attack had occurred. NATO’s actions over 
the last three years have clearly signaled to its members that Russian aggression against 
the Alliance will not be tolerated. 
Nonetheless, if Russia should decide to invade a Baltic State, it would still be a 
matter of time before NATO could mobilize its conventional forces to respond with the 
VJTF or NRF. While the invaded country might be quickly overrun by numerically 
superior Russian forces, an event like this would trigger a massive response from NATO. 
This response would not be a unilateral effort organized solely by the United States. 
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While overall command would fall to the Supreme Allied Commander – Europe 
(SACEUR—a U.S. 4-star general officer), command of the NRF belongs to one of 
NATO’s two joint forces commands: JFC-Brunssum or JFC-Naples. JFC-Brunssum is 
currently commanded by an Italian 4-star general officer.  
The point of drawing attention to this chain of command is to illustrate how 
foolish it would be for the United States to help a fellow NATO member prepare to resist 
without coordinating these efforts within NATO. After all, the resistance force would 
need to synchronize its unconventional warfare campaign with the NRF counter-attack in 
order to maximize both forces’ effectiveness. In other words, resistance plans would need 
to be coordinated and synchronized with NATO response plans, which requires more 
than just the U.S. working separately with individual countries. Effective lines of 
communication should be established not just within an occupied or attacked country, but 
among neighbors and their resistance forces as well. For instance, how much more 
effective would a resistance in Estonia be if those forces were able to coordinate with the 
Lithuanian or Latvian resistance? 
Remote as the occupation of Estonia might seem, such a scenario offers a clear 
window into the kinds of circumstances under which unconventional warfare is most 
likely to work in the future. Not surprisingly, this is not dissimilar to the successful 
Jedburgh efforts of World War II, when the United States did not act alone, but instead 
contributed to a multilateral effort. Not only would those conducting UW would have a 
shared adversary and shared objectives, but the campaign would also be completely 
justified in the eyes of the international community. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, it would be defensive in nature. The purpose would not be to overthrow a 
sitting regime, but instead to defend an ally from an outside aggressor. Or, if we were to 
summarize via a “check-list” of criteria that would need to be met for UW to be an 
appropriate strategy: 
 The action must be defensive in nature—preemptive regime change 
should be avoided.  
 The action must be justified in the eyes of the international community. 
The United States can no longer “go it alone.” 
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 The action must be multilateral in nature. The Jedburghs succeeded in part 
thanks to their multinational teams, since at least one member was from 
the country in which they operated. This ensured at least some level of 
cultural connectivity to the population being assisted. 
 There must be a long-term, shared objective. Marriages of convenience 
should be avoided at all costs since they will simply lead to more complex 
problem sets following the UW campaign. 
 UW should be conducted with current allies in a way that allows for some 
level of multi-lateral preparation. The U.S. coordinating potential 
resistance activities with Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia through a shared 
command, such as the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) 
would be a good example of this. 
 The resistance must have a strategic leader at the top of its chain of 
command. This leader has to be able to coordinate with NATO, the United 
States, or a coalition, and have a high level of control of the resistance 
forces to prevent post-conflict issues. 
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VII. UW AS A STRATEGY, THE ROLE OF SPECIAL FORCES, 
AND FINAL THOUGHTS 
A. WILL A COHERENT STRATEGY FIX THIS? 
The never-ending nature of the debate over UW can be seen most recently in the 
response to a recent War on the Rocks article, written by Captain Andrea Filozof.193 
Captain Filozof’s article notes that proxy forces are unpredictable and often have long-
term policy objectives that do not align with U.S. objectives.194 She also uses the term, 
“policy blowback,” to describe situations in which long-term success is sacrificed for 
short-term solutions.195 Additionally, Captain Filozof succinctly captures the dangers of 
assuming that unconventional warfare can limit long-term U.S. commitments or 
involvement: 
This doctrine [UW] holds that the United States can exert its influence 
through limited involvement to achieve its policy objectives, sidestepping 
the publicly unpalatable notion of large and prolonged military 
commitments. Yet the perception that unconventional warfare requires 
only limited involvement is a dangerous illusion. Not only does training 
and equipping proxy forces still exact a heavy financial cost, but the 
operational success of proxy forces often does not lead to the desired 
political outcome. Serious problems arise when ways and means are not 
connected to ends. Without organic political solutions to accompany 
unconventional warfare campaigns, the United States will at best waste 
vast amounts of defense spending; at worst, it will find itself entangled in 
the same costly, long-term operations it has endured in Iraq and 
Afghanistan with little to show for its efforts.196 
Within hours of the article being published, Colonel (Retired) Dave Maxwell 
provided his comments and critique. Maxwell, a retired Special Forces officer, is the 
author of multiple articles on UW in forums like War on the Rocks and Small Wars 
Journal, and was also a member of the working group that developed the current 
                                                 
193 Andrea Filozof, “Unconventional Warfare Is Not the Answer to Your Problem,” War on the Rocks, 






definition. In his response to Captain Filozof, he objects to her reference to the Jedburghs 
by calling it a “tired analogy of the UW in WWII France,” and states that her writing, 
“belies the fact that she does not understand unconventional warfare (or acknowledge the 
concepts of foreign UW being conducted by adversaries).”197 
Maxwell writes in one of his own articles that although the current definition of 
UW is designed “to be a broad definition and apply generally to this form of warfare and 
not specifically from a U.S. centric perspective, it continues to connote a very narrow 
description of warfare (e.g., the overthrow of a hostile government) and has often been 
relegated to the province of Special Operations Forces and more specifically Special 
Forces.”198 However, a slightly different perspective is offered by Lieutenant Colonel 
(Retired) Mark Grdovic, another member of the working group. 
According to Grdovic, the purpose of the working group was to clarify the 
definition of UW, not to change it.199 He notes that, “decision makers need to be clear 
what you are seeking and need to have confidence you understand “it.” So, our approach 
was to force any user of the definition into a clear box for what you are conveying and 
also for what you would need to understand as a practitioner.”200 
This difference in opinion is reflected in more of Maxwell’s writings. In a 2013 
article, Maxwell writes that, “there is controversy over the definition and many do not 
agree with it even in the Special Operations community.”201 He thus exposes a glaring 
problem with unconventional warfare—if the doctrinal definition cannot be agreed upon, 
or even understood by a company grade officer like Captain Filozof,202 then how can it 
be properly conveyed to and understood by senior decision makers who often lack 
military experience? 
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Maxwell tackles this problem head on in several of his articles (one is even titled, 
“Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?”). At the heart of Maxwell’s 
argument is his opinion that UW is a strategy—one that is being used against the United 
States by its adversaries, but that is not properly understood by Americans.203 In an 
article called, “Unconventional Warfare Does Not Belong to Special Forces,”204 he has 
also argued that, “the strategic mission of UW belongs to policy makers and strategists at 
the national level.”205  
A possible conclusion from reading Maxwell’s articles is that unconventional 
warfare itself is not the problem. Instead, the problem is a lack of understanding about 
what UW really is, combined with the lack of a coherent, national strategy and policy 
governing the use of UW. Or, as Maxwell tries to point out to Captain Filozof, “It is not 
UW that is the problem. It is our lack of understanding and our misapplication of UW 
concepts that is [sic] the problem.”206 
Here, I respectfully disagree. As this thesis has tried to make clear, the definition 
is problematic, further complicated by Special Forces’ claim that they are the nation’s 
UW force. Of course, the real issue can be illustrated in the example of a U.S. embassy 
team, trying to work daily with its host nation government to further U.S. interests 
abroad. How do they perceive the prospect of Special Forces working in their country, 
when SF advertises its core competency as coercing, disrupting, or overthrowing 
governments?  
In a recent PowerPoint brief to my peer group, the Commander of Special 
Operations Command Africa (SOCAF) displayed unconventional warfare as a grayed-out 
capability; this, he explained, was to prevent audiences from associating UW with SOF 
activities on the continent. Recently, too, a fellow SF officer at the Special Operations 
Legislative Affairs (SOLA) office mentioned to me that UW is a contentious issue for 
civilian policy makers in Washington, DC. Meanwhile, UW is not even included in 
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NATO SOF doctrine. This is because the Alliance is built on the concept of collective 
defense, and does not want to entertain the notion of offensively interfering with other 
countries, especially when some NATO members are more worried about UW being used 
against them. 
The evidence seems overwhelming: If no one outside of SF wishes to entertain 
the idea of engaging in UW as it is currently defined, then perhaps UW is the problem, at 
least as it has been defined in SF doctrine over the last 20 years. Put more simply, if you 
are the only person in the room advocating for an offensive UW mission that no one else 
wants to undertake, then maybe it is time to reevaluate offensive UW and its utility in 
today’s environment. 
As for the argument that what is needed is a coherent national strategy and policy 
to govern UW, consider the Cold War, during which the U.S. consistently used UW as 
part of its national strategy against communism to avoid conventional or nuclear war. 
During the 1950s, “Eisenhower was very cautious about committing military forces, 
understanding from experience the risks of unintended consequences. But his fondness 
for deception tempted him to see covert action as a policy tool (and blinded him to the 
potential high cost of coups gone wrong).”207  
By definition, a strategy should cover an extended period of time. For instance, a 
chess grandmaster strategizes not by only thinking about his next move, but by planning 
three or four moves in ahead. Based on his experience and the rules of chess, the 
grandmaster tries to predict what his moves will provoke his opponent to do. But, no 
matter how good a grandmaster might be at chess, strategizing is not likely to work if his 
every move throws the playing field into total disarray, or if the game has no rules at all. 
Here is how developing a strategy around UW becomes problematic: UW 
inherently destabilizes a country, and sometimes an entire region. Even the best planned, 
most well-intentioned UW campaigns will create some level of instability as the efforts 
undertaken begin to affect the targeted government. The more the government is 
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destabilized, the more unpredictable its actions become, in addition to freeing up an even 
more unpredictable population that wants to have its say. In the midst of this chaos, how 
can the United States possibly build viable policies and strategies? 
B. THE PREMIER COMBINED FORCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
To be clear, this is not to say that Army Special Forces should entirely abandon 
the concept of unconventional warfare, or should stop training and educating its 
personnel on the UW mission. Knowing how to conduct UW is still valuable in the event 
that it is needed. However, it needs to be acknowledged that offensive UW is one of the 
least likely missions SF will be asked to perform. Indeed, short of defending an occupied 
ally, it is likely that engaging in UW will do more harm than good. Because of this, UW 
is not the mission set that SF should prioritize, or claim as its core competency. 
In addition to claiming to be the United States’ UW force, SF has also declared 
itself in recent years to be “the only element in the U.S. Armed Forces organized, trained, 
and equipped specifically for UW.”208 However, this claim is misleading. While 
equipment and training has been updated through the years, the basic organization of a 
Special Forces ODA, or A-Team, has not been significantly altered since 1952. In other 
words, the organization of the basic Special Forces unit has never been adapted to the 
changing definition of UW.  
Additionally, offensive UW has never belonged to Special Forces. The CIA ran 
UW operations fairly exclusively until the Vietnam War, with SF participating only in 
limited UW efforts afterwards (e.g., the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan or the 2003 
supporting effort in the invasion of Iraq). The CIA’s own historical archives describe its 
UW efforts during the Cold War as having produced mixed results at best. So why would 
SF now want to claim a historically troubled mission set as its core task? More 
importantly, if UW is not the answer for SF, what is? 
The answer is actually quite simple. Green Berets are really good at working with 
other people. Foreign internal defense, a mission that seeks to strengthen a host nation’s 
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security forces and help stabilize a country or region, has been the true success story for 
Special Forces over the years: 
Many examples exist of successful, long-duration, low visibility U.S. 
SOF-centric FID operations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. From 
1980 through 1991, U.S. support to the government of El Salvador 
fighting an insurgency in that country included an advisory force that 
never exceeded 55 personnel. The conflict ended with a favorable 
negotiated settlement. Similar success against lower level insurgencies 
took place in neighboring Honduras and Guatemala. More recently, U.S. 
SOF have played a central role in effective long-term FID efforts 
conducted in support of the governments of Colombia and the 
Philippines.209 
However, FID’s doctrinal definition focuses primarily on assisting other 
governments counter internal threats, such as “subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, 
terrorism, and other threats to their security.”210 This has opened the door to the 
conventional military conducting security force assistance (SFA), since that definition 
also includes “transnational threats.”211 
Exacerbating this issue is the fact that SOF essentially ceded the train, advise, and 
assist mission to the conventional military in 2002. When it came time to build an Afghan 
National Army, the mission went to Task Force PHOENIX, commanded by then-Colonel 
Mark Milley, the commander of 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division.212 By the time 
Task Force PHOENIX II assumed this training mission, even the regular Army could not 
be bothered to participate, handing what was arguably the most important tasking at that 
time over to the Army National Guard. 
Similar decisions took place during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. As an infantry 
lieutenant assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division in 2006, I and my platoon were tasked 
with training an entire Kurdish battalion during our 15-month deployment. The ODAs 
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assigned to our forward operating base worked only with an Iraqi SOF unit of 
approximately 20 men, rotating out every six months. This represents just one example of 
what occurred across the entire force, in both Afghanistan and Iraq: SOF sought to only 
train other SOF, while the conventional military would stand up and train the Afghan 
National Army and the Iraqi Army. This was the division of labor, despite the fact that 
conventional units like mine were devoid of cultural knowledge or local language 
capability, and were trained only for unilateral operations. To make matters worse, most 
conventional units were more focused on learning how to conduct counterinsurgency 
operations, leaving the training of their partner force as a lower priority.  
After the Iraqi Army nearly collapsed in the face of an ISIS offensive in 2014, the 
United States launched Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, and once again deployed 
troops to Iraq. While the stated mission of the task force in Iraq remains to defeat ISIS,213 
ground troops have been deployed not to fight directly, but instead to train and stabilize 
the Iraqi Army. The first unit chosen to execute this mission was 3rd Brigade, 82nd 
Airborne Division, a conventional military unit. 
Once the assessment was made that the Iraqi Army needed to be retrained, the 
first thought of any senior decision maker should have been, “Where are my Special 
Forces?” 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) should have been a logical first choice for 
standing up a joint task force. However, external perceptions of Special Forces no longer 
support it being the force of choice for a massive train, advise, and assist missions like 
Operation INHERENT RESOLVE. The “Big Army” perception of what SF does instead 
can best be seen in a 2-star general officer’s recent comment to me: “Remember, SOF 
trains other SOF.”  
While the debate over whether the conventional military can train a force as well 
as Special Forces can exceed the scope of this thesis, the merits of the composition of the 
force and the force structure across both types of unit can be quickly examined: is it 
really preferable to task an 18-year old U.S. private, trained only for his role in a 
unilateral squad-level attack, to conduct the equivalent of basic training for an Iraqi 
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private? Or, should the task instead go to a specially selected, and well trained, Green 
Beret. By requirement, the Green Beret is an NCO with cultural and language training, in 
addition to possessing knowledge about small unit tactics. Would the Iraqi private 
respond better to training from an SF NCO than from an American infantry private? That 
question deserves deeper study and discussion, but the answer should already be known 
by every senior decision maker, whether civilian or military. 
FID and SFA are not “sexy” mission sets to be sure. But, arguably, they are what 
Special Forces is best at. Thus, instead of declaring itself to be the UW force for the 
United States, Special Forces should consider promoting itself as the premier combined 
force of choice for the U.S. military. Combined is defined by the Department of Defense 
as “two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies operating together.”214 In other 
words, if there is a task requiring work with a partner force, Special Forces should be the 
first unit considered for the job. The work could range from providing basic training to 
Colombian Army recruits, to practicing combined counterterrorism techniques with the 
German Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK), to accompanying and fighting next to Iraqi 
Army battalions in battles against ISIS. 
By shifting the narrative away from UW and back to combined missions, Special 
Forces would not only increase its relevance amongst today’s Special Operations Forces, 
but it would also take important steps toward regaining its autonomy in operations around 
the world. Initially in Vietnam, Green Berets were dispatched as advisors, but were 
trusted to train and accompany their partner forces as they saw fit. These partners ranged 
from conventional Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalions to irregular Montagnard 
Civilian Irregular Defense units. Provided a host nation agrees, today’s Special Forces 
should be given the same level of autonomy and trust to perform their advisory missions 
in any conditions. 
C. A FINAL NOTE: COUNTER-UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
One aim of this thesis has been to call into question the wisdom of the United 
States conducting offensive unconventional warfare. Many of the objections that can be 
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raised about UW are not shared by other countries, some of which are currently 
conducting UW against the United States and its allies. As Colonel Maxwell notes, “UW 
is widely practiced in various forms today and has adapted to modern conditions . . . It is 
imperative that the U.S. military and strategists and policy makers have a deep 
understanding of unconventional warfare and the requirement to counter it in the coming 
years.”215 
As previously noted, Russia may have conducted a form of UW by disrupting the 
2016 U.S. presidential election, perhaps going so far as to actually coerce portions of the 
American population into voting a certain way.216 Russia’s use of surrogates and SOF 
during the seizure of Crimea and the ongoing war in Ukraine reflect another use of UW. 
Iran continues to use proxy forces across the Middle East to further its interests, 
sometimes attempting to coerce or disrupt governments that the U.S. is working to assist 
and stabilize. These adversaries clearly do not have the same political, ethical, or 
diplomatic concerns as the United States does when it comes to conducting 
unconventional warfare.  
Because of this, counter-unconventional warfare also warrants further discussion 
and study. However, simply understanding how to execute a tactic does not necessarily 
mean you are the best at countering its use. Discussions about counter-UW should start at 
the strategic level. Does counter-unconventional warfare, for instance, warrant its own 
definition? Should it be a mission set assigned to a particular force? Or should it simply 
be treated as a line of effort within another strategy? 
As important as these questions are, Army Special Forces should also evaluate 
whether their force structure and knowledge of UW makes them the optimal force for 
countering an adversary’s UW efforts. It is quite possible that SF would make a perfect 
counter UW force. But it is also possible that what is required to counter UW is better 
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executed by another type of unit. The answer can only be found in an additional hard-
nosed, unsentimental study.  
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